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Abstract
How long shall a country take to learn the world technological fron-
tier? What would happen if that country found the same diﬃculties in
learning the true model of its economy? After all, countries catching up
often experience life-changing transformations during the catch-up to a
balanced growth path. We show that an open economy, learning ratio-
nal expectations alongside foreign technology, may be characterized by
excessive saving and current account surpluses, as often observed in the
data and at odds with the standard open economy theoretical predic-
tions, and not fully explained by standard adaptations such as habit for-
mation. Moreover, such a learning process in a large developing country
can upset the savings behavior of a fully rational expectations advanced
country. In a US-China calibration, we show that this eﬀect can be so
strong as to explain important current account imbalances, the savings
glut hypothesis, as well as the distribution of factor income.
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1 Introduction
The workhorse neoclassical model makes very clear predictions about the
relationship between the current account and long term or persistent produc-
tivity growth (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). In the face of persistent growth,
consumption increases in excess of current output and is supplemented by
capital inﬂows; similar patterns are present for investment decisions, which re-
spond positively to expected future total factor productivity increases. Hence,
lower savings and higher investments should be associated with faster techno-
logical progress. Faster growing economies should be on the receiving end of
international capital ﬂows and these ﬂows should be increasing in productivity
growth.
In addition to the emergence of global imbalances, a negative relation-
ship between persistent economic growth and capital inﬂows has emerged over
a longer period starting in 1980s for non-developed economies, the allocation
puzzle (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych,
2014). This premise relies on three key features that deserve greater attention.
First, the neoclassical model in relation to these puzzles subsumes perfectly
functioning ﬁnancial markets. Second, analysis often focuses on a represen-
tative agent framework, abstracting from life-cycle savings motives and de-
mographic structure. Third, it relies on the ability of agents to rationally
forecast the persistent growth component as well as future marginal utility of
consumption.
Many explanations for global imbalances and the allocation puzzle focus
on the ﬁrst and second points. In a model of equilibrium global imbalances,
Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008a) show that uphill capital ﬂows may
emerge as a result of depressed supply of safe assets in developing economies.
In their non-Ricardian model, ﬁnancial market frictions translate into a low
share of the total claims to future output in the economy that can be traded,
depressing autarky interest rates and directing capital abroad in seek of safe
assets. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) argue that it is a lack of
supply for contingent claims in the presence of idiosyncratic risks and, as a
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consequence, precautionary savings motives that can explain current account
surpluses. Similar arguments have been made for developing economies on the
investment side: Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) argue that a lack of
ﬁnancial intermediation prevents domestic savings from being channeled into
productive investments; and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) model
ﬁnancial frictions which prevent loans from being allocated to highly produc-
tive investment in the private sector as the source of capital outﬂows in the
Chinese case.
Such frictions may also be able to explain the negative relationship between
capital inﬂows and productivity growth documented in Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013). Capital market frictions prevent households from being able to borrow
against future productivity growth, which is exacerbated in faster growing
economies, generating higher pressure to borrow initially and store value as
countries continue to transition. This channel relies on the fact that ﬁnancial
development does not allow the supply of ﬁnancial assets to keep pace with
growth in the economy's demand for assets along the transition, so that agents
in countries with higher productivity growth are more susceptible to ﬁnancial
frictions.
However, in a panel of developed and developing economies, Gruber and
Kamin (2009) do not ﬁnd systematic evidence that measures of ﬁnancial de-
velopment such as credit to GDP ratio or capitalization of stock markets can
explain the direction of observed capital ﬂows. Furthermore, Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013), point out that the allocation puzzle is strongest for developing
economies that are the most ﬁnancially integrated (and perhaps equipped with
more developed ﬁnancial markets).
Central to the emergence of both imbalances and the puzzling allocation of
capital, is an underlying positive relationship between savings and economic
growth. The work of Carroll and Weil (1993) highlights the causal channel
running from economic growth to household saving, which can be accounted
for in a model of habit formation where agents adjust consumption slowly
(Carroll and Weil, 1993; Carroll, Overland, and Weil, 2000). In this paper, we
show that in otherwise standard small open economy and a two large country
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neoclassical model, agents learning to become rational in their consumption
decisions along with technological convergence introduces a form of consump-
tion persistence. This novel channel of persistence can explain the emergence
of global imbalances between two large regions that we calibrate to the China
and United States case. Additionally, we show that the eﬀect is increasing
in the growth of total factor productivity, and thus it can also explain the
allocation puzzle.
At the root of our mechanism is indeed a positive correlation between
saving rate and rate of growth, however, as we document in Section 8, habit
formation is not enough to generate proximity of the model's predictions to
the data. In other words, the extent of underconsumption observed from many
fast-growing converging economies cannot be suﬃciently explained with habit
formation in an open economy model.
Models with an overlapping generation structure may also predict positive
relationship between savings and growth, diﬀering from the standard neoclas-
sical model (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2009). Recent research has focused on the
demographic structure in explaining a feedback loop that allows causation in
both directions. Mehlum, Torvik, and Valente (2013) in a two sector, overlap-
ping generations (OLG) economy, derive the "savings multiplier" of economic
growth that emerges via more redistribution to a young generation of savers
and by increasing the cost of old age care. The model is able to explain why
faster-growing economies exhibit higher saving rates absent any additional
market imperfections.
Further, research in this area highlights implications of the interaction of
economic growth and ﬁnancial frictions in a life-cycle framework for private
saving. Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2012) consider demographic structure
with economic growth diﬀerentials and heterogeneous borrowing constraints
in a two country model calibrated for China and the US. Their model is able
to replicate divergence of private savings rates, global imbalances and falling
interest rates, while making predictions for the age-speciﬁc savings behavior
in the presence of economic growth.
To the third point, to our knowledge, little work has considered the role
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that expectation formation has on the savings and investment decisions of
agents in developing economies and thus, to the issues surrounding equilibrium
international capital ﬂows.
In the present paper, we incorporate extrapolative expectations (where
agents rely on their more recent experience) into a small open economy, dy-
namic general equilibrium (DGE) model that can be brought to the data. We
use a reduced form of learning, where agents forming expectations are learn-
ing to rationally forecast their future marginal utility, that is endogenous to
the path of development. When this occurs, we show that a negative pat-
tern between realized economic growth and capital inﬂows may emerge that
is strengthened for higher productivity growth. Global imbalances are present
when we extend the same features of the model to a two country world.
A growing literature in macroeconomics has found important support em-
pirically for alternative expectation formations. Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel
(2010) incorporate extrapolative expectations into a standard macro forecast-
ing model and show that, in a wide variety of settings, observed macroeco-
nomic variables such as consumption, inﬂation, output and investment are
better approximated by the incorporation of expectations based on some form
of extrapolation bias. Similar approaches have been used for statistical learn-
ing by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and behavioral model by De Grauwe
(2012).
Although we highlight an expectational mechanism, we view our approach
to be complementary to the friction channels that may aﬀect savings and
investment decisions in developing economies. When agents use more recent
experience to form expectations as transition begins, this represents a market
friction between what is optimal given the true model and what agents judge to
be optimal. This channel operates via a distortion in agents' optimal savings
behavior.
The basic intuition behind our results is as follows. At the beginning of
a transition to a balanced growth path associated with a higher productivity
levels, agents must learn to forecast rationally along with the new model of
their economy. As this occurs, they rely on more recent experience for forming
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their expectations. Agents at the beginning of transition tend to underesti-
mate the extent of their marginal utility of consumption and the unconstrained
consumer smooths consumption to a new level that reﬂects the increase in per-
ceived marginal utility of income. Consumption is therefore too low and excess
saving ﬂows out of the economy. This mechanism is augmented with higher
productivity growth and higher convergence. Our expectational mechanism
is consistent with the well documented positive relationship between savings
and economic growth, but goes a step further in that it oﬀers an additional
channel that supports causation running from economic growth to savings.
Our results have major implications not only for the pattern of capital
ﬂows between and among converging economies. Even in a closed economy
setting, our channel impacts the shape and level of capital accumulation during
convergence. Both the level of capital to labor ratio and its shape over the
transition are aﬀected, oﬀering new results for the distribution of factor income
for converging economies. These implications are discussed in greater detail
in Section 8.
2 Stylized Facts
Among the empirical facts well documented by the international economic
literature has been the emergence of the global imbalances documented in Fig-
ure 1, which shows current account as a ratio to world GDP for a select group
of economies. Current account imbalances emerged from the mid 1990s and
increase towards the late 1990s after the east Asian ﬁnancial crisis. For the
United States deﬁcits persist throughout the 2000s, with a signiﬁcant improve-
ment from 2006 to 2007 and a further improvement after the ﬁnancial crisis.
Current account deﬁcits do not return to previous levels after the ﬁnancial
crisis.
The US deﬁcits are matched by current account surpluses from fast grow-
ing, emerging economies on the whole, most particularly developing Asia, oil
producing economies, and former Soviet countries. A sizable current account
surplus arises in most of these economies starting in the late 1990s.
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Figure 1: Current Account Imbalances
source: authors' calculations, WEO Database, IMF
As a consequence of current account imbalances, large (in absolute value)
net foreign asset positionsparticularly for the United States and Chinahas
emerged, shown in Figure 2. This ﬁgure shows both the reported net foreign
asset position over GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and also the
cumulative sum of capital account deﬁcits for the two countries using the
same dataset. Both series are ﬁltered of business cycle frequencies using an
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
The US and China held positions that were relatively small as a percentage
of GDP until the mid-1990s, when current account imbalances between the two
countries emerged. The growth in magnitude of these international investment
positions accelerated into the 2000s and were reduced after the ﬁnancial crisis.
For the US case, however, the reduction is less pronounced relative to US GDP.
There is robust evidence of a negative relationship between economic growth
and the capital account shown in Figure 3. This ﬁgure shows the relationship
between the cross sectional average capital account over GDP and average
trend total factor productivity growth over the period 1995 to 2011 for non-
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Figure 2: Net International Investment Position 1995-2011, US and China
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OECD countries.1
This evidence tells us that not only does capital ﬂow out of fast growing,
developing economies, this relationship is extenuated in faster growing, higher
investing developing economies. This is an extension of the ﬁndings of Gour-
inchas and Jeanne (2013) for a sample including transition economies and for
the time period 1995 to 2011.
Our parsimonious model, introduced in the following section, and numeri-
cal exercises, are able to replicate the salient features of the emerged stylized
facts introduced above. We provide particular explanation for the imbalances
emerging between the United States and China since the 1990s and the ev-
idence for a negative relationship between productivity growth and capital
inﬂows over the same period.
1The sample of 68 non-OECD countries is the same as that used in Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013) including transitional economies with available data from 1995. The slope of
the line shown in the graph is -0.25 and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 3: Negative Relationship between CrossSectional average Capital In-
ﬂows and Growth
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3 Model - Small Open Economy
To make our results more transparent, but without loss of generality, we
here use a simple small open economy neoclassical growth model, with inelastic
labor supply and no capital adjustment costs. Since we are interested in long-
run relationship, we focus on deterministic trend growth and abstract from the
stochastic growth component characteristic of the business cycle literature.
The economy is populated by an inﬁnite number of identical households
who maximize their expected lifetime utility with respect to consumption,
E0
1X
t=0
t
c1 t   1
1  
: (1)
Population is held constant and normalized to 1, so that consumption corre-
sponds also to per capita consumption. We use in eq. (1) a standard CRRA
utility function in consumption only, where  is the inverse elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution.
Households maximize utility with respect to consumption subject to the
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ﬂow budget constraint given by
dt = (1 + rt 1)dt 1 + ct + it   yt; (2)
where dt is the household's end of period t debt position, rt 1 is the cost of
international borrowing, ct is per capita consumption, yt is per capita income
and it is investment per capita.
The law of motion for capital stock is
kt = it + (1  )kt 1; (3)
where  is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
Output of a single good in the economy is produced using the following
technology
yt = k

t (tht)
1 ; (4)
where ht is inelastic labor supply, and t is a labor-augmenting technology
parameter. We normalize inelastic labor supply to ht = 1.
2 We discuss the
time path for productivity parameter as a combination of trend growth and
productivity convergence in the following section.
We assume the domestic interest rate, rt is
rt = r + ﬃ(e
dt
yt
 
d
y   1): (5)
The cost of borrowing is comprised of the world interest rate, reﬂecting the
marginal product of capital minus depreciation of economies that are on the
balanced growth path, and a spread. The spread is increasing in the level of
average household debt over income,
dt
yt
, relative to some long term average,
d
y
, where ﬃ is a measure of the sensitivity of the interest rate with respect to
debt to income ratio. Notice that while in equilibrium dt = dt, households will
take dt as given in their utility maximization problem.
2At a later stage, we may consider a model which accounts for demographics and diﬀer-
ence in labor across countries. For now, we analyze the case where countries are allowed to
diﬀer only in their technological advancement.
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As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and now standard in the literature,
we incorporate this assumption in order to ﬁnd a balanced growth path that
does not rely on initial conditions of debt in each country.3 This is a technical
reason. However, as it becomes apparent in the quantitative results, the sta-
tionarity inducing assumption operates over the very long run, and impacts
only marginally the dynamics we wish to analyze.4 Furthermore, while gener-
ally used for business cycle analysis, the fact that the country spread should
be increasing in the debt to GDP ratio ﬁnds support in literature on the long
run determinants of country spreads (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci,
2010).5
3.1 Productivity Growth
In the present paper, we analyze how the incorporation of learning to be-
come rational along with the true model of the economy into a standard macro
model impacts the predicted relationship between capital ﬂows and long run
convergence to a balanced growth path.
Growth in the economy is derived from exogenous growth of the produc-
tivity parameter, t. We assume the technological frontier grows at gross
exogenous rate, g, which represents the long run, balanced growth factor of
the most advanced economies. We highlight the case of convergence, or the
economy catching up to the technological frontier. We formulate a catch-up
parameter as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) as follows,
t =
t
0eg
t
: (6)
3Without this closing assumption, the deterministic steady state depends on initial debt
levels. This assumption is shown to be plausible over business cycle frequencies (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2003)
4For example, one may be concerned that the relative strength of income and substitu-
tion eﬀects with falling interest rates may impact the direction of our results. Our results
are robust to diﬀerent values of the IES.
5It is important to note that the predictions of our model are not sensitive to the
introduction of various closing methods used in the small open economy literature, including
internal debt elastic interest rate and portfolio adjustment costs.
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This catch-up parameter measures the growth in the economy over t periods
relative to that of the frontier.6 With this formulation, we are able to describe
technological convergence in a single parameter, where t > 1 for an economy
that catches up to the technological frontier, t < 1 for an economy that is
lagging behind, and t = 1 for countries growing at the rate of the frontier.
It is important to note, that our model does not rely on full convergence to
the productivity frontier; in fact, the economy may converge to any balanced
growth path.
Rewriting eq. (6) in terms of t and t 1 and rearranging,
t = e
g t
t 1
t 1: (7)
The gross growth rate in the economy is comprised of a balanced growth
component and a productivity frontier convergence or catch-up component.
In order to examine the transition of the economy during convergence, we
assume the time path for catch-up,
t = (1   )t 1 +  ; (8)
with 0 <  < 1. With this formulation, the economy catches up during a
transition to a value of , to which the productivity parameter converges. In
this sense, one may consider t to be the cumulative growth in excess of the
frontier.
Considering this formulation of the productivity catch up, t is a concave
function of time: countries that begin to converge to the balanced growth
path do so very quickly towards the beginning, and then experience slower
long term convergence over time.
6One may rewrite eq.(6) as the ratio of growth factors between the domestic economy
and the frontier.
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3.2 Equilibrium
Households choose optimal paths for ct, dt and kt+1 given initial conditions,
d0 = d, k0 > 0, taking the path of dt as given, and subject to eq. (2) and the
no Ponzi-game condition,
lim
j!1
dt+jQt+j 1
i=t 1 (1 + rt+i)
 0: (9)
The necessary conditions for the above optimization problem are,
c t = t (10)
t = (1 + rt)E^t(t+1) (11)
t = [E^t(t+1)][k
 1
t+1 + (1  )] (12)
where t is the shadow price of consumption and where the E^t may correspond
to the true conditional expectation for the rational case, or the extrapolative
conditional forecast with learning. Eqs. (11) and (12) are the consumption
Euler and capital demand equations, respectively. Eq. (10) is the deﬁnition
of marginal utility from the CRRA utility function.
The above ﬁrst order conditions together with Equations (2), (3), (4), (5)
and given k0 > 0 and d0 = d describe the dynamical system completely.
3.3 Expectation Formation
The transitional dynamics during productivity convergence are largely de-
termined by agents' expectations of future marginal utility of consumption
relative to expected future return on savings and investment. Given the key
role for the forward looking behavior of agents in the model, the assumptions
on the formation of expectations on future variables are central to the dynamic
predictions of the model.
The standard rational expectations assumption imposes very strict require-
ments on the computational ability of agents in the model. While we follow
this approach in the stable environment of advanced countries, we instead as-
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sume that in countries experiencing a transitional path, consumers are unable
to perform the rational expectations predictions perfectly and instead rely on
their more recent experience. More generally, we ﬁnd the experiential interpre-
tation particularly plausible in the absence of the balanced growth path. Our
departure from the rational expectation is minimal as it aﬀects only the way
the consumers imagine their future marginal utility in a country in transforma-
tion. Firms are assumed to always formulate their production and investment
plans under fully rational expectations.
In fact, in our small open economy model the economy begins transi-
tion with a technological growth away from balanced growth. When labor-
augmenting technological progress begins its convergence process, agents in
the economy must learn to use the rational expectations forecast along the
transitional path to balanced growth. In such a situation, we ﬁnd it natural
to assume that agents may not trust their predictions about their future will
to consume and supplement forecasts based on the true model of the economy
with purely extrapolative beliefs, forming a forecast of their future marginal
utility that is a convex combination of forecasts based on the true model and
one that extrapolates on past values.
Within this framework, we postulate that the representative household's
forecast at time t for t+1 is
E^tt+1 = tt 1 + (1  t)Ett+1; (13)
where, t is the share of the household's forecast that is purely extrapolative.
As a ﬁrst step, we assume that t evolves according to the reduced form
autoregressive process,
t = (1   )t 1 +  ; (14)
where agents are becoming fully rational at the rate in which they are con-
verging to the balanced growth path.7 As a consequence, the weight of ex-
7One could allow agents to form nowcasts", or assume agents may observe perfectly
the current state of the economy. Agents using current period forecasts do not signiﬁcantly
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trapolation in the forecast converges from above to 0. Thus, this reduced form
assumption for the evolution of t represents a gradual learning of agents to
forecast true model of the economy, as they converge to the balanced growth
path8
We assume that the law of motion of  strictly reﬂects that of distance to
the balanced growth path. In a robustness test, we also test it using a calibra-
tion, in order not to force our conclusion. Quite interestingly, the calibration
returns a very similar result to the direct empirical counterpart of convergence.
With the incorporation of the forecast for t+1, the dynamical system is
completely described by,
t = (1 + rt)[tt 1 + (1  t)Ett+1] (15)
t = [tt 1 + (1  t)Ett+1][k
 1
t+1 + (1  )] (16)
together with eqs. (2), (3), (5), (4), (14).
In eq. (16), we assume that ﬁrm owners are rational in the sense that
they know the true model of growth aﬀecting the productivity of their ﬁrm's
capital.
4 Quantitative Exercise
In a deterministic setting, we simulate technological convergence of the
economy to the frontier. We simulate this case both for the standard ratio-
nal expectations model and for the case with learning. While, for exhibition
purposes, we simulate the full convergence of the Chinese economy, as we will
see later, our results do not rely on unconditional convergence, but hold for
convergence to any balanced growth path.
Along the balanced growth path, at the frontier, the technology parameter,
t, grows at an gross exogenous rate, g
. Therefore, we explain productivity
convergence to the frontier using our catch-up parameter, t, that reaches a
change the results presented here, but change the shape of the transition slightly.
8The reduced form process for t is easily microfounded with adaptive learning.
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steady state level once convergence is attained.
We calculate total factor productivity using an approach common in growth
and development account literature. Namely, from our production function
t =

yt
kt
1=(1 )
, where yt and kt are real GDP and capital stock per employed
labor from PWT 8.1. Our measure for TFP is then the trend component of
t, using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter of 100.
A signiﬁcant portion of cross-country diﬀerences in capital labor ratios are
explained with diﬀerence in complementary inputs to TFP such as human
capital (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). We account for this important fact by
incorporating human capital in our calculation of TFP as follows,
t =

yt
kt
1=(1 )
=hct; (17)
where hc is the human capital measure taking from PWT 8.1.9 The real GDP
measure corrects for changing references prices and PPP exchange rates over
time and, as such, is comparable across countries and over time.10
The growth rate of the frontier is proxied by the long run, growth rate
of trend total factor productivity in the United States of 1:013 from 1995 to
2011,
g = ln

2011
1995

=(2011  1995): (18)
For sake of example, the simulation mimics the convergence of the People's
Republic of China relative to the United States. While China is clearly not a
small open economy, it has, with little doubt, been at the forefront of intrigue
regarding the savings glut hypothesis and studies of excess saving during pe-
9This measure is derived from Barro-Lee average years of schooling and return based
measures. In general, the measure follows standard approaches in the development account-
ing literature. Please see Feenstra et al. (2013) for an exposition of how this measure is
derived.
10We use the real GDP measure based on output side, the variable rgdpo, which takes
into account the relative prices in exports and imports in additional to ﬁnal goods in the
calculation of PPPs over time. This will give a better measure of productivity changes over
time, as it accounts for the aﬀects of changing terms of trade on real GDP measure. We
ﬁnd this of particular importance in a sample, which includes emerging economies.
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riods of high economic growth. Our choice of small open economy is for ease
of exposition of our results. We perform an identical exercise (with essentially
identical results) for a two region case in Section 7.
To calibrate the terminal catch-up parameter, , TFP is assumed to grow
at the frontier by a constant rate, g,
t = e
gt0: (19)
China is catching up over the simulation and TFP grows according to,
t = e
gt t
0
0: (20)
By deﬁnition, after full convergence the Chinese TFP growth should equal
that of the US or frontier and therefore,

0
=
0
0
: (21)
Normalizing 0 to 1 and taking the ratio of our measure of US TFP to
Chinese TFP, we calibrate  = 7:95. This parameter measures the initial
distance to the productivity frontier. That is, in 1995 the Chinese level of
TFP was roughly one eighth that of the US.
The model is calibrated to annual data. The number of years that it takes
the economy to converge to the frontier is governed by eq. (8) and speciﬁcally,
parameter  . From 1995 to 2011, Chinese trend TFP grows from 1; 400:02 to
1; 993:75, a factor of 1.42. From eq. (8), we have after 17 years, the value of
the catchup parameter 16 = 1:15. Plugging this into eq. (8) for t = 17 we
can solve for  = 0:0013.
Despite the high annual growth in trend TFP in China from 1995 to 2011
in excess of 2.2 percent, absent further diﬀerences in demographic patterns,
capital to labor ratios (aside from complementary inputs), capital shares, the
halfway point to convergence is attained after around 500 years! The length of
catch-up would be naturally reduced should we examine the case of conditional
convergence.
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The world interest rate, r is taken as the interest rate along a balanced
growth path. Combining eqs. (10) and (11) and assuming that all variables
grow at exogenous rate, g, along the balanced growth path, we have that
r = (eg

)=   1. Considering the frontier growth of 0:013, and assuming a
subjective discount factor in the utility function of  = 0:96, this gives us
a world interest rate of 5.53 percent, which is slightly lower than the value
taken in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) and the long-run average return on
capital markets as measured for developing countries of 6.9 percent (Caselli
and Feyrer, 2007).
The remaining parameters are taken from standard values in the literature.
We assume a positive rate of depreciation of 6 percent, a capital share is
assumed to be  = 0:3 and an inverse elasticity of substitution parameter, 
of 1.11 The parameter governing the elasticity of the interest rate with respect
to average debt to GDP ratio, ﬃ, is set to 0.035. This is in line with estimates
of the sensitivity of country interest rates to debt to GDP ratios found in the
literature (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).12
The initial share of extrapolation in the forecast is latent. We estimate 0
using a simulated method of moments approach, that minimizes the sum of
squared distance between our model's predictions for current account balance
over GDP to the empirical counterpart in China taken as trend current account
over GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) from 1995 to 2011. This
estimation exercise results in an estimated ^0 = 0:4865. The transitional path
of t is displayed in Figure 4.
All parameter values used in the simulation exercise are shown in Table 1.
The simulation begins at time, t = 0, for the of productivity catch-up by
11Our assumption of log utility is not essential for our results. With  > 1, the substi-
tution eﬀect is dominated by a negative income eﬀect resulting from falling interest rates,
which exacerbates our results. With log utility, we are able to isolate the eﬀects from our
expectational channel and a positive wealth eﬀect.
12A value of ﬃ = 0:035 means for a 1 percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio
for China, interest rates increase around 3.5 basis points. This is consistent with estimates
in the literature of the elasticity of country interest rates with respect to debt to GDP
ratios, that long run country interest rates increase 2 to 7 basis points with an increase of
one percentage point in debt to GDP ratio (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).
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Calibrated Parameters
Frontier TFP growth rate g 1.013 eq.(18), eq. (17) & PWT 8.1 data
Initial convergence parameter 0 1.00 normalization
Final convergence parameter  7.95 eq.(21), eq. (17) & PWT 8.1
Speed of tech. convergence  0.0013 from eq. (8) & PWT 8.1
Parameters from literature
Depreciation rate  0.06 Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
Capital share of income  0.30 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
Discount factor  0.96 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
CRRA parameter  1.00 log utility
Steady state debt/GDP ratio d 0 full repayment of debt in long run
Interest rate sensitivity ﬃ 0.035 Kinoshita (2006); Kumar and Baldacci (2010)
Estimated parameters
Initial share of extrapolation 0 0.4865 estimated via simulated method of moments
Final extrapolation share  0 rational agents along balanced growth path
Table 1: Parameters used for simulation
assuming an initial balanced growth path at a low initial productivity level
relative to the frontier. At t = 1, convergence begins and total growth in the
economy rises from 1.013 to in excess of 1.022. Figure 4 shows the transition
of productivity growth and productivity catch-up.
The predictions of the neoclassical open economyand rational expectations
modelare well known. From an intertemporal perspective, forward looking
agents in a country experiencing rapid technological convergence should bor-
row from abroad to increase current consumption in excess of current output.
Therefore, absent any capital market frictions, we would expect there to be
an immediate deterioration in the trade balance to GDP ratio, which recovers
over time as output catches up to consumption.
The model's predictions for NFA position over GDP, current account and
trade balance over GDP, capital stock over GDP and the interest rate are
shown in Figure 5. The ﬁgure also shows Chinese data for the empirical coun-
terparts to the model.13 The rational expectations (RE) model's transition is
13The trade balance to GDP ratio is taken from the World Bank's external balance of
goods and services as a percentage of GDP and the NFA over GDP and current account
over GDP series calculated from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) EWN Mark II database.
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Figure 4: Share of Extrapolation, Simulation of Productivity Convergence
shown in the red dotted line and the adaptive learning version in solid blue
line. In the RE case, we observe a transition in the trade balance as expected:
there is an initial deterioration in the trade balance, which is corrected over
time, as the output growth catches up to the optimal consumption path.
Our model with learning during convergence, with the presence of ex-
trapolation in the expectation formation, conveys a very diﬀerent prediction.
Quickly after the start of convergence, large trade surpluses emerge, rising to
a maximum of around 5.5 percent of GDP after about 7 years, then falling
thereafter, but remaining positive until 14 years after the start of convergence.
Thereafter, trade deﬁcits emerge that are persistent and more reﬂective of the
RE predictions.
The RE prediction for external borrowing is also clear in the case of long run
excess productivity growth. A growing country should increase international
debt levels, borrowing from abroad in order to ﬁnance consumption in excess
of output. In the learning case, we observe large net foreign asset positions
relative to GDP emerging in this economy that reach 50 percent of GDP about
Capital stock is taken from the real capital stock from PWT 8.1 and the interest rate is
taken as the Chinese deposit rate from IMF's International Financial Statistics. All series
are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 100. The NFA
over GDP is absent valuation eﬀects and taken as the cumulative sum of current account
surpluses plus initial NFA position in 1980.
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15 years after transition begins.
The predictions of our model are very consistent with the data for China.
The simple small open economy model, with parameters estimated directly
from observables, is able to replicate the magnitude of observed trade balance
over GDP of 4 percent almost exactly. Furthermore, the shape and magnitude
NFA over GDP in our model is highly reﬂective of the emergence of large NFA
position that has grown to 30 percent of GDP in China since the mid 1990s.
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Figure 5: Quantitative Results, Chinese Data
It is worth noting that the interest rate falls after convergence begins.
While this is mechanically due to the formulation of the interest rate being
debt elastic, this is consistent with evidence of falling rates of return to capital
in China during the 1990s that increase thereafter (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian,
2006).
More generally, the simple learning during convergence model appears
largely consistent with the data, particularly compared with the predictions in
the case of rational expectations. The simulation results for the main variables
of our small open economy model are shown in Figure 15 in Appendix A.
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Evidence Across Countries
China has taken center stage in the discourse of global imbalances and
savings glut until now. We are interested in what our model would predict
for capital ﬂows and allocation for diﬀerent countries, with varying degrees of
convergence. Furthermore, in order for the expectation channel to explain the
allocation puzzle, our model must predict an increase in saving in excess of
investment for higher growth in total factor productivity during convergence.
Our results are not isolated to the miraculous growth experience in China
used in our simulation, but accommodate the diverse convergence experiences
of developing economies. Figure 6 shows the model's predictions for average
current account over GDP for the ﬁrst 20 years of convergence for varying
TFP growth values. Clearly, as the extent of convergence increases, countries
with extrapolation in their expectation formation experience greater capital
outﬂows.
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Figure 6: Average Current Account over GDP for Varying TFP Growth
Small open developing economies will also have diverse initial extrapola-
tion forecasts. In our quantitative exercise of productivity convergence, initial
forecasts are comprised of about one half extrapolative and one half based on
the rational expectations forecast, reﬂected by an initial  share of 0.4865. The
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emergence of current account surpluses during do not rely on a high value of
this parameter speciﬁc to the Chinese case. Therefore, a lower initial 0 share
can also accommodate countries starting out closer to the balanced growth
path and, therefore, that are better able to forecast rationally.
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Figure 7: Average Current Account over GDP with Varying Initial Share of
Extrapolation
Figure 7 shows the model's predictions for the average current account to
GDP ratio over the ﬁrst 20 years of convergence. The expectation mecha-
nism in our model does not rely on agents being purely extrapolative, but
predicts that current account surpluses may emerge with an initial weight of
extrapolation in excess of 0.20, given a high convergence parameter of 7.95.
Interestingly, the threshold 0 for which surpluses emerge is increasing in the
convergence parameter. Given the fast TFP growth in China, this fact allows
other developing economies with lower TFP growth to exhibit current account
surpluses for much lower shares of extrapolation. Any extent of extrapolation
increases the current account surplus predicted by our model relative to the
rational expectations benchmark.
How do these model-simulated results reconcile with real development ex-
periences of other countries over the same time period? We conduct our esti-
mation exercise for 0 across countries. That is, for a sample of 29 converging,
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non-OECD economies with data available from 1995 to 2011, we calculate
directly, from our measure of TFP discussed above,  and convergence param-
eter,  . Using these country-speciﬁc convergence parameters, we estimate ^0
using the same simulated method of moments estimation as the baseline sim-
ulation introduced above.14 A detailed discussion of this exercise is presented
in Appendix B. The cross-country parameters used in the simulation as well
as the estimated initial share of extrapolation for countries in our sample are
shown in Table 3 in Appendix B.
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Figure 8: Cross Country Evidence, 29 Converging Economies
Figure 8, shows the results of the cross-country simulation exercise. First,
panel (a) shows a strong, positive relationship between the initial extrapolation
shares and average productivity growth from 1995 to 2011. Countries that are
growing faster during convergence, and therefore initially further away from
balanced growth, tend to initially rely more on past experience when forming
their expectations.
Panel (b) shows the empirical counterpart to Figure 7. Not only are higher
initial extrapolation shares associated with higher TFP growth factors, but
also greater capital outﬂows during convergence. Thus our mechanism appears
to be able to explain, at least partially, the cross-sectional allocation of capital
14We choose the sample period 1995-2011 for consistency with the Chinese experience,
however, the results of this exercise also hold for the sample period 1990-2011.
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across converging economies.
Finally, panel (c) shows the empirical counterpart to Figure 6. Consistent
with our extended evidence of the negative relationship between capital inﬂows
and productivity growth from our stylized facts, there is a positive relationship
between average current account surpluses over GDP and average TFP growth
from 1995 to 2011.
5 Welfare Eﬀects
How important is the excess saving that results during convergence for
welfare? We compare the consumption equivalent changes in welfare during
productivity convergence with rational expectations versus our model with
learning.
The agent's productivity adjusted utility function is,
~Ut =
1X
j=0
j [ln(~ct+j) + ln(t+j)] ; (22)
where ~c is productivity adjusted consumption.
We deﬁne productivity adjusted welfare, ~Wt, as
~Wt  ~Ut  
1X
j=0
j ln(t+j) =
1X
j=0
jln(~ct+j): (23)
We may write the ﬂow productivity welfare as,
~Wt = ln ct +  ~Wt+1: (24)
With our assumption of exogenous productivity growth, there is a steady
state in levels for productivity adjusted consumption, ~c, which, solving eq.
(23) for the steady state ~c, is
~c = exp((1  ) ~W ): (25)
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After the start of convergence, the value of ~Wt represents the present dis-
counted utility of productivity adjusted consumption during the whole tran-
sition. Therefore, by comparing the productivity adjusted consumption levels
for the value of welfare in the rational expectations case and the learning case,
we are able to evaluate the impact of varying expectation formation on the
welfare of convergence.
With log preferences and same parameters taken in the quantitative exer-
cise in the previous section, the presence of extrapolation in the forecast for the
marginal utility of consumption reduces welfare to the equivalent of reducing
consumption by about 1.4 percentreducing consumption per eﬀective unit of
labor from 1.19 to 1.17.
6 Two Country World - Global Imbalances
In order to explore global imbalances in the context of our model, we recast
the basic economy in terms of a two large economy model.
In the large open economy model, we assume two countries, Country A,
a large industrialized country, and Country B, a large developing economy
and analyze the interactions of these two economies during convergence to
a balanced growth path. Country A is assumed to be at the frontier and
Country B converges to the balanced growth path of the frontier. As such,
the industrial economy grows at the long run rate of growth of the frontier,
g. The developing economy catches up to the frontier and grows at a rate,
gt > g
, during convergence.
Productivity evolves in Country A,
At = e
gAt 1 (26)
and in Country B,
Bt = e
g 
B
t
Bt 1
Bt 1: (27)
The structure of the model is the same in each countries apart from the fol-
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lowing additional assumptions. As before, in the learning case, we assume that
agents form their expectations based on a convex combination of extrapolative
expectation and rational expectation of the marginal utility of consumption.
Learning takes place during catch-up as agents learn to trust the true model of
the economy. Therefore, we assume that the expectation formation for Coun-
try A at the frontier is purely derived from the true model of the economy and
the learning case is present only in Country B.
The treatment of the interest rate is also diﬀerent in the two-country case.
We assume that risk premium applies only to the case of Country B so that
the interest rate at which Country A may borrow is rA, whereas Country B's
cost of borrowing is determined by a risk premium related to the level of debt
over GDP relative to some average, d,
rBt = r
A
t + ﬃ(e
dBt
yB
t
 
d
y
  1): (28)
Our choice of which country pays (receives) and positive (negative) premium
does not aﬀect the quantitatively in all calibrations.15 In addition, each coun-
try, i = A;B has the production function,
yit = k
i
t

(ith
i
t)
1 : (29)
Capital evolves in each economy according to,
kit+1 = i
i
t + (1  )k
i
t (30)
We assume that households maximize the same expected lifetime utility
function as eq. (1) subject to a budget constraint,
dit = (1 + r
i
t 1)d
i
t 1 + c
i
t + i
i
t   yt: (31)
Households in each country i choose cit, d
i
t, k
i
t+1 subject to eq. (31), taking
15We have also tested whether rebating the premium back to Chinese households impacts
our results. The impact is negligible.
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as given the path for dBt and given initial conditions, k
A
0 > 0, k
B
0 > 0 and
dA0 ; d
B
0 . The ﬁrst order conditions for each country in the adaptive learning
case are
cAt
 
= At (32)
cBt
 
= Bt (33)
At = (1 + r
A
t )Et(t+1) (34)
At = E^t(
A
t+1)[k
A
t+1
 1
+ (1  )] (35)
Bt = (1 + r
B
t )[t
B
t 1 + (1  t)Et
B
t+1] (36)
Bt = [t
B
t 1 + (1  t)Et
B
t+1][k
B
t+1
 1
+ (1  )]: (37)
To close the model, we impose a market clearing condition for international
debt,
dAt =  d
B
t (38)
since Country B can only borrow from abroad, the net foreign assets of country
B must be equal to the net foreign liabilities of Country A.
As a consequence of the previous equation, the goods world market clearing
condition holds:
cAt + c
B
t + i
A
t + i
B
t = y
A
t + y
B
t : (39)
Eqs. (32)-(37) together with eqs. (29), (30), (31), (28), (39), (38), (26)
and (27) together with kA0 ; k
B
0 > 0 and d
A
0 ; d
B
0 =
d describes our two-country
world.
7 Global Imbalances
In our two country world, we simulate again a transition for the Chinese
economy converging towards the productivity frontier. We perform an iden-
tical exercise to that in Section 4. The parameters used in the simulation
exercise are listed in Table 2.
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Parameters both Countries
Depreciation Rate  0.06
Capital share of income  0.30
Frontier growth rate g 1.013
Discount factor  0.96
CRRA parameter  1.00
Steady state debt/GDP ratio d 0
Parameters for China
Final convergence parameter  7.95
Speed of tech. convergence  0.0013
Initial share of extrapolation 0 0.595
Table 2: Parameter Values for two-country simulation
The US interest rate is taken from the balanced growth path equation for
the interest rate in US, rUS = (eg

)= 1. With frontier growth of 1:013, and
assuming a subjective discount factor in the utility function,  = 0:96. This
gives us a US interest rate of 5.53 percent, which is consistent with slightly
higher interest rates in the US around the start of our productivity convergence
in 1995, which decrease (along with world interest rates) over time (Caballero
et al., 2008a).
The main results for the US and China for this exercise are shown in Figures
16-17 in Appendix A. Figure 9 shows the main results for the simulation using
Chinese data. The rational expectation model (the dashed red line) predicts
an initial trade deﬁcit over GDP as initially as China transitions to higher
technology, consumption will increase above current output produced with
the given capital stock. As the result of this debt-ﬁnanced consumption in
excess of output, China would be accumulating debt, generating a negative
net foreign asset position.
If agents are tempted to rely more on their more recent experience in form-
ing expectations of future marginal utility of consumption, a very diﬀerent
prediction materializes. A trade surplus emerges in the initial stages of conver-
gence. Consumers tend not to trust the ability for future economic growth to
enable them a sustained higher level of consumption and thus under-consume
relative to output. This trade surplus persists for about 15 years before re-
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turning to a deﬁcit, more consistent with rational expectation model.
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Figure 9: Quantitative Results, Chinese Data
During initial convergence, excess savings is channeled abroad to US debt
and Chinese net foreign assets over GDP expands quite signiﬁcantly in excess
of 60 percent of GDP after around 15 years of catch-up. Interestingly, the
positive NFA position takes quite some time to unwind and Chinese net foreign
assets remain positive well into transition.
The two-country model replicates well the size and evolution of NFA posi-
tions over GDP observed in the datafor both the Chinese and US cases shown
in Figures 9 and 10, respectively. Our model oﬀers an important prediction
for global imbalances should China continue its transition: as consumers in
China learn to trust the true model of technological convergence, the imbal-
ances that have been at center stage of policy and academic debate since their
emergence, will tend to disappear. China's consumers will learn to trust eco-
nomic growth in the economy and imbalances will tend to diminish as they
catch-up to rational expectations and the balanced growth path of frontier
economies.
With the exception of capital stock over GDP in the US, our model repli-
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Figure 10: Quantitative Results, US data
cates not only the current account to GDP ratio in China for which 0 is
estimated, but also other variables. Particularly noteworthy is the ability of
the expectational channel to capture both the magnitude and time path of
variables describing the Chinese economy during transition.
8 Discussion
In addition to the stylized facts that we aim to explain with our simple
model, there are several larger implications from our ﬁndings. These are dis-
cussed in turn below.
Habit Formation
One might wonder if our results may be replicated using a more standard
model feature of habit formation. Until our exercise, this point remained
an open research question. In what follows, we include habit formation in the
model and show the simulation results. As will become apparent, the inclusion
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of habit formation is not powerful enough to explain our stylized facts. In a
next step, we include both in the model and allow the data to calibrate both
the initial share of extrapolation in the forecast of marginal utility as well as
the parameter governing the strength of habits.
We keep the standard model introduced in Section 3, but include habit
formation in a non-separable form into the preferences of households.
E0
1X
t=0
t
(ct   2ct 1)
1    1
1  
; (40)
where 2 governs the strength of habits and will ultimately slow the growth
rate of consumption. We can see this from the consumption Euler equation,
(ct   2ct 1)
  = (1 + rt)(ct+1   2ct)
 : (41)
An unconstrained household cares about the marginal utility derived from
consumption levels and consumption growth. In a converging economy con-
sumption growth will remain sticky due to the lower marginal utility that
households derive from large shifts in consumption.
We test the suitability of the habit formation model to our data using the
same estimation exercise as before, only with rational expectations assumption
and habit formation. Our estimation exercise results in an intensity of habit
parameter of ^2 = 0:99. The results of the quantitative exercise for carrying
over the parameters from the initial exercise are shown for the small open
economy and two large economy cases in Figures 11 and 18 in Appendix A,
respectively.
Figure 11 shows the data for China in the dashed black line and the model's
prediction with habit formation in solid green. What becomes immediately
clear is that, despite the high intensity of habits, the model is unable to repli-
cate our stylized facts. While habit formation is important and very successful
in inducing persistence at business cycle frequencies, it does not allow model
predictions to match systematic imbalances at lower frequencies, in which
households rationally anticipate the eﬀects of their consumption habits dur-
31
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
NFA over GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Current Account over GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Trade Balance over GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
Capital Stock over GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Interest Rate
Habit Formation, mu2 = 0.99
Data, China
Figure 11: Quantitative Results Small Open Economy, Habit formation
ing the growth process. This suggests that learning plays a crucial role in
understanding persistent imbalances in the growth and development process.
Similar results hold for the two country model with habit formation. These
results are shown in Figures 18 in Appendix A.
We also conduct our quantitative analysis including the habit formation
with the expectation formation simultaneously, allowing the data to estimate
the parameters of initial share of extrapolation and the intensity of habits.
The consumption Euler equation in this case looks like,
(ct 2ct 1)
  = (1+ rt)(t(ct 1 2ct 2)
 +(1 t)(ct+1 2ct)
 ): (42)
We follow the same procedure as before in estimating the parameters 0
and 2. The results of the joint estimation is 0 = 0:47 and 2 = 0:66. The
results of this exercise are shown below.
Figure 12 shows the results for the simulation with learning and habit
formation in green. Data for China is reﬂected in the dashed black line.
Clearly, the model with both habit formation and our learning channel ﬁts
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Figure 12: Quantitative Results Small Open Economy, Learning with habit
formation
the data for the Chinese case and is able to replicate our stylized facts quite
well.
Factor Income Distribution
Upon receiving news of convergence with rational expectations, even in an
economy closed to world capital markets, households should rely on future
economic growth to allow them to smooth consumption and therefore save
less. Firms will increase investment, anticipating higher future marginal pro-
ductivity. Therefore, the capital to labor ratio will determine the impact of
convergence on the real wage.
In our baseline model we highlight the savings channel of learning. In other
words, while investment reﬂects decision based on the true path for produc-
tivity in the economy, and thus gets investment decisions right, households
save too much. The capital to labor ratio is higher in an economy converging
to the frontier because of the excess savings of households. The implications
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Figure 13: Factor Income during Convergence
for factor incomes should be clear at this point. Real wages under rational
expectations would have risen less in China since the 1990's than our model
predicts. Therefore, the way expectations and learning takes place in con-
verging countries has major implications for the distribution of factor income
worldwide.
Figure 13 makes this point plain. It shows labor income per eﬃciency unit
and the marginal product of capital for the US and China during the ﬁrst
50 years after Chinese convergence. Given a common productivity scenario
within each country for both model types, in the learning during convergence
case, real labor income is larger with learning than with rational expectations.
This has implications for the distribution of factor incomes in China during
its transition experience.
What is also interesting is that in the converging economy, the diﬀerential
eﬀect of learning on real labor income seems to be quite large. Figure 14 depicts
the real labor income in China and the US for ﬁrst 50 years of convergence
of the Chinese economy. In the Chinese case, real labor income is up to 10
percent higher with learning than under rational expectations. The diﬀerences
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Figure 14: Labor Income during Convergence
are instead negligible in the frontier economy.
9 Conclusion
Technological catch-up entails a huge transformation in the converging
countries' standards of living, often long before the country will have con-
verged to a balanced growth path. During this sometimes dramatic transition,
it is likely that consumers fail to perfectly predict their and their oﬀspring's
future desire for consumption independently from their recent past experience.
We therefore claim that a past of starvation or hardship will make a devel-
oping country's average household wish to save more for the future, simply
because they may be incapable of imagining how close to satisfaction they and
their children will be. This relative lack of self awarenesscertainly conﬂicting
with a textbook view of developing countries borrowing against an optimistic
futuremay also be justiﬁed by the higher complexity of rational expectations
on an economy's transition towards a more stationary environment. As they
get closer to a more balanced growth path, they will learn to trust the rational
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expectations view of the economy, and they will realize that so much saving is
not necessary to guarantee an acceptable future.
This paper oﬀers two simple theoretical and numerical examples of how
the excess savings of a country catching upboth to the balanced growth path
and to rational expectations modelingcould help to solve the allocation puzzle
which characterizes many developing countries, and to contribute to explain
important global imbalances, such as China's massive net foreign asset accu-
mulation.
Quite remarkably in our two country world analysis, despite the US be-
ing assumed fully rational, the Chinese gradual catching up to fully rational
expectations may even explain the US debt over accumulation. In this sense,
our model gives an additional theoretical underpinning to the savings glut
hypothesis" formulated by Bernanke (2005).
It is important to remark that in order to make our point clear, we have
operated under highly simplistic assumptions, most notably neglecting the
important investment and saving frictions that plague developing countries
(Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013), as well as the process of ﬁnancial development
and exchange rate liberalization gradually taking place in a country such as
China, highlighted by Caballero et al. (2008a,b) and Song et al. (2011, 2014).
Hence we view our contribution as complementary to the analyses of these
important issues.
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Appendix A
Figure 15: SOE Simulation of Productivity Convergence
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Appendix B
In Section 8 we test the generalizability of our results to the convergence
experience of other economies. Therefore, we conduct a model simulation
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Figure 16: United States: Two Country Simulation of Productivity Conver-
gence
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Figure 17: China: Two Country Simulation of Productivity Convergence
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exercises on a sample of converging economies.
From a total sample of 108 countries from PWT 8.1 with data available
from 1995 to 2011, we calculate per employment output and capital stock,
using (emp), real GDP (rgdpo) and capital stock (rkna. Human capital is the
variable, hc. All variables are HP ﬁltered with smoothing parameter  = 100.
With these variables, TFP is calcualted using eq. (17). For each country,
we calculate Average productivity growth from 1995 to 2011 using eq. (18) and
the convergence parameter, i from eq.(21). Finally, the speed of technological
convergence (and learning) parameter,  i is found using the solution to eq. (8).
We exclude OECD countries, adding back in Mexico, Turkey and Korea as
in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). We also include transitional economies of
eastern Europe, with data available during our sample period.
We are interested in explaining convergence to a balance growth path from
below. That is, we are interested in explaining capital ﬂows for countries
beginning from a level below that of the productivity frontier. As such, we
exclude countries that are not converging during the period 1995 to 2011: that
is with  < 0 or  < 1. This leaves us with a sample of 36 economies.
Finally, we observe several countries that are very distant from the pro-
ductivity frontier. As our model assumes perfectly functioning capital markets
and no oﬃcial role for government aid, we exclude economies exhibiting con-
vergence parameters that exceed the 90th percentile. These countries are likely
not to have access to international capital markets and receive a large portion
of GDP in the form of oﬃcial aid ﬂows. This leaves us with a sample of 29
converging economies for which we carry out our simulation exercise.
We calculate the average capital inﬂows over the period 1995 to 2011 using
data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Capital inﬂows are taken to be
the negative of the current account measure in current US Dollars and GDP
in current US Dollars. Both series are smoothed using an HP ﬁlter with
smoothing parameter,  = 100.
The resulting data as well as the estimation results for initial extrapolation
shares are listed below in Table 3.
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Figure 18: Quantitative Results China and the US, model with habit formation
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Country   g (TFP) Avg. CA=Y ^0
Argentina 6.29 0.008 0.043 0.002 0.336
Armenia 7.75 0.012 0.06 0.107 0
Benin 11.71 0.001 0.019 0.064 0
Bolivia 10.04 0.003 0.033 -0.010 0.294
Botswana 10.99 0.001 0.025 -0.073 0.532
Bulgaria 3.66 0.0001 0.013 0.086 0
China, People's Republic 7.95 0.001 0.022 -0.041 0.490
China, Hong Kong 1.67 0.012 0.020 -0.070 0.672
China, Macao 3.82 0.055 0.075 -0.170 0.546
Croatia 1.76 0.037 0.032 0.053 0
Cyprus 1.95 0.027 0.032 0.056 0
India 7.72 0.006 0.044 0.010 0.336
Jordan 13.64 0.006 0.060 0.044 0.299
Kazakhstan 5.38 0.021 0.064 0.023 0.350
Latvia 2.68 0.021 0.038 0.085 0
Lesotho 11.64 0.001 0.019 0.075 0
Lithuania 3.30 0.021 0.045 0.076 0
Malaysia 2.88 0.008 0.027 -0.092 0.672
Malta 1.80 0.005 0.017 0.055 0
Mauritania 5.04 0.001 0.016 0.097 0
Republic of Moldova 9.50 0.002 0.025 0.095 0
Romania 7.75 0.024 0.085 0.072 0.350
Russia 3.85 0.013 0.041 -0.065 0.588
Serbia 3.44 0.029 0.054 0.091 0.700
Singapore 3.50 0.054 0.070 -0.187 0.700
Sri Lanka 3.84 0.002 0.017 0.038 0
Thailand 14.83 0.001 0.020 -0.018 0.338
Trinidad and Tobago 2.88 0.254 0.079 -0.130 0.700
Ukraine 11.94 0.002 0.031 0.004 0.338
Table 3: Variables for Cross Country Simulation
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